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STILL “LEFT IN THE DARK”:  
THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND CHILD ABUSE CASES 
AFTER DAVIS V. WASHINGTON 
Anthony J. Franze & Jacob E. Smiles*† 
Introduction 
In his concurring opinion in Crawford v. Washington, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist criticized the majority for holding that the Confrontation Clause 
applies to “testimonial” statements but leaving for “another day” any effort 
to define sufficiently what “testimonial” means. Prosecutors and defendants, 
he said, “should not be left in the dark in this manner.”  
Over the next two years, both sides grappled with the meaning of testi-
monial, each gleaning import from sections of Crawford that seemingly 
proved their test was the right one. When the Court granted certiorari in 
Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana (hereinafter Davis), hopes 
were high that the Court would provide the answers—the definitive test for 
testimonial. Not surprisingly, it did not.  
That is not to say that the decision was a wash. In domestic violence 
cases—particularly when a domestic violence victim makes statements to a 
police officer or 911 operator during an on-going emergency—the Court did 
clarify the parameters of the Confrontation Clause. But what the Court did 
not do, and in all fairness had no need to do given the context in which the 
cases arose, was clarify issues surrounding one of the other core classes of 
cases impacted by Crawford: child abuse prosecutions.  
In this essay, we consider the potential implications of Davis on two is-
sues relevant to child abuse cases: how the Court’s new test for 
“testimonial” might apply when the statements are by a child claiming abuse 
and whether statements to non-law enforcement personnel can ever be tes-
timonial. We then briefly identify a few of the many questions left 
unanswered by the decision. Though Davis certainly has implications for 
child abuse cases, true clarity will have to wait for yet another day. 
I. Is the New Test Relevant to Child Abuse Prosecutions?  
In Davis, the Court adopted a new test for “testimonial” statements: 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police 
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the 
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primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance 
to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the cir-
cumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing 
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution.  
On its face, the “primary purpose/ongoing emergency” test appears 
largely irrelevant to most child abuse cases. Rarely, if ever, will a victim of 
child sexual abuse run down the street screaming for help while being 
chased by the perpetrator. Instead, child sexual abuse typically occurs in 
secret, and the perpetrators are usually family members or others who ex-
ploit a trusting relationship with the child. As the Court in Pennsylvania v. 
Ritchie recognized almost two decades ago, “[c]hild abuse is one of the 
most difficult crimes to detect and prosecute, in large part because there of-
ten are no witnesses except the victim.” Viewed narrowly, then, the new test 
suggests little relevance to child abuse cases.  
Stepping back, however, the “primary purpose” component of the test 
will likely find its way into the testimonial analysis concerning statements 
made by child victims. The Davis Court focused on a targeted main purpose 
(dealing with emergency) as a means to exclude an alternative improper 
purpose (proving past events for potential use in prosecution). No principled 
reason supports limiting the test solely to situations involving the emer-
gency/non-emergency dichotomy if statements arise in other contexts 
clearly suggesting that the primary purpose was something other than prov-
ing past events for prosecution. In child abuse cases, for instance, when a 
parent talks to a child about injuries to the child’s genitals, a teacher asks 
about unusual behavior, or a doctor asks questions relevant to treatment, the 
primary purpose is not to prove past events for prosecution, but to protect or 
treat the child. Similarly, the primary purpose of forensic examinations—
which often are performed by state social workers who may work in child 
protection teams that include law enforcement—is to protect the health and 
welfare of the child. Indeed, the primary purpose approach is consistent in 
many ways with a pre-Davis analysis used by some courts, which looked to 
the purposes underlying forensic interviews and medical exams in assessing 
the testimonial nature of statements made by child victims.  
A question also exists whether other post-Crawford tests for “testimo-
nial” survive Davis. Many courts, drawing on language from Crawford, 
applied a “reasonable person” test to determine whether a statement was 
testimonial. Generally, a statement was testimonial if a reasonable declarant 
would believe that the statements would be used at trial. For child abuse 
cases, the key issue became whether this inquiry was viewed from a reason-
able adult’s perspective or that of a reasonable child the age of the declarant. 
The standard chosen often determined the outcome. Reasonable adults often 
would know statements could be for prosecutorial purposes; most young 
children would not. At least with regard to statements by adults, Davis ap-
pears to leave little room for the reasonable person standard. It was the test 
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strongly urged by both petitioners in Davis and was not adopted by the 
Court. On the contrary, the Court shifted focus away from the declarant to 
the motives of the police. That said, the Court did not reject other tests. 
Given the lack of definitive guidance, courts already seem to be resorting to 
pre-Davis formulations in assessing whether statements are testimonial.  
II. Statements to Non-Law Enforcement & the BRASIER Case 
In many ways, Davis is potentially more important in child abuse cases 
for what the Court expressly declined to do. The petitioner in Hammon 
urged the Court to adopt a test for “testimonial” that could have included 
statements made to someone other than a government officer. The Court not 
only adopted a different test, it explicitly declined to rule on whether state-
ments made to non-law enforcement personnel can ever be “testimonial.” 
Why is this important in child abuse cases? Most child sexual abuse vic-
tims do not report the abuse to the police. To the extent they ever disclose 
abuse, they do so to family members or other trusted adults. These adults, in 
turn, report to the police (though surprisingly less frequently than one would 
hope). Thereafter, the child may recount the abuse to medical personnel, 
social workers, or others before statements are made by the child (if ever) 
directly to the police. If these statements to non-law enforcement necessarily 
cannot be “testimonial,” a core class of statements remains available in 
prosecutions where the child is too young or too traumatized to testify. In-
deed, a number of lower courts have concluded that statements to non-law 
enforcement personnel or agents cannot be testimonial, though the decisions 
are not unanimous.  
Some scholars and at least one court have suggested, however, that 
Davis’s brief discussion of the 1779 King v. Brasier case hints that the Con-
frontation Clause should cover statements made to non-government 
individuals. In Brasier, a five year old girl told her mother and another 
woman living in the home that the defendant had raped her. At trial, the 
mother and the other woman testified as to what the child had said because 
the child had been presumed incompetent and was not produced to testify at 
trial. The defendant was convicted. On appeal, the court overturned the con-
viction stating “no testimony whatever can be legally received except upon 
oath; and that an infant, though under the age of seven years, may be sworn 
in a criminal prosecution, provided such infant appears, on strict examina-
tion by the Court, to possess a sufficient knowledge of the nature and 
consequences of an oath . . . .” The court concluded, therefore, “that the evi-
dence of the information which the infant had give to her mother and the 
other witness, ought not to have been received.”  
Responding to petitioner Davis’s arguments that Brasier supported treat-
ing the victim’s statements to the 911 operator as testimonial, the Court said 
that Brasier “would be helpful to Davis if the relevant statement had been the 
girl’s screams for aid as she was being chased by her assailant. But by the 
time the victim got home, her story was an account of past events.” One pos-
sible inference from this characterization is that Brasier suggests that the 
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young victim’s statements were “testimonial” even though made to non-law 
enforcement. That inference, however, is unwarranted.  
First, the Brasier decision contains only a few paragraphs of discussion, 
and can be misleading when divorced from its procedural and historical con-
text. When reviewed in context, the decision is not a case about 
confrontation at all, but rather, about the competency of child witnesses and 
(implicitly) the rule of best evidence, which, according to leading scholars 
from the period, was the guiding principle of evidence at the time.  
Before Brasier, young children were presumed by law to be incompetent 
to give sworn testimony in court. As a result, children who might otherwise be 
available to testify were not permitted to do so. Courts, however, often permit-
ted prosecutions based on out-of-court statements made by “incompetent” 
children to adults concerning sexual abuse. Indeed, the Old Bailey Proceed-
ings, considered the best accounts of criminal trials during the eighteenth 
century, report numerous cases where family members were permitted to tes-
tify about what children had told them regarding alleged sexual abuse. In light 
of this practice, Sir Matthew Hale, a prominent legal scholar, had suggested 
that courts might as well hear also directly from the child victims, even if 
these children were incompetent to take the oath. Hale reasoned that “if the 
child complains presently of the wrong done to her to the mother or other re-
lations, their evidence upon oath shall be taken, yet it is but a narrative of what 
the child told them without oath, and there is much more reason for the court 
to hear the relation of the child herself” particularly because abuse usually 
occurred in secret and only the child could provide a first-hand account of the 
abuse. Although the Brasier decision does not explicitly discuss this issue, the 
trial court raised a question about the conviction’s validity, citing to the very 
page of Hale’s treatise that advocated allowing child victims to testify 
unsworn. This indicates that a principal issue in Brasier was whether, under 
Hale’s theory, the child should have been allowed to testify unsworn. This, 
then, explains the holding in Brasier that “no testimony whatever can be le-
gally received except upon oath.” The court was rejecting Hale’s view that 
children should be permitted to testify unsworn, and was not characterizing 
the child’s out-of-court statements to the mother and friend as “testimony.” 
The Brasier court, however, went one step further and addressed the broader 
question of whether children, like the victim in the case, should be presumed 
incompetent based solely on their age. The court found they should not be pre-
sumed incompetent and that children under seven years old could be sworn if 
they possessed sufficient knowledge of the nature and consequences of the oath.  
Thus, Brasier was a landmark case because of its holding on child compe-
tency. The competency determinations, in conjunction with the rule of best 
evidence, influenced the court’s ruling on the inadmissibility of the statements 
of the mother and friend. If the child in Brasier was found competent to tes-
tify, her testimony would have been the best evidence available, as compared 
to the child’s out-of-court statements provided by the witnesses. Because the 
lower court did not determine whether the child was competent to testify, the 
court overturned the conviction. Brasier thus did not decide whether the 
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mother and friend would have been able to testify about what they were told 
about the abuse had the child been found incompetent to testify.  
Second, any inference that the Court’s discussion of Brasier suggests 
that statements to non-government individuals can be testimonial is offset 
by the Court’s reference in Crawford and Davis to its pre-Crawford decision 
in White v. Illinois. In White, the Court allowed an abused child’s mother, 
babysitter, emergency room nurse, doctor, and an investigating officer to 
recount the child’s out-of-court statements, even though the child did not 
testify herself. In a footnote in Crawford (referenced in Davis), the Court 
questioned whether the investigating officer’s testimony in White should 
have been admitted, but did not question the admissibility of the non-
government witnesses’ testimony. Finally, Davis’s recognition that “formal-
ity is indeed essential to testimonial utterance[s]” further offsets any 
inference that the Court’s reference to Brasier supports a finding that state-
ments to non-law enforcement are testimonial. Statements to family 
members or others with no connection to the police suggest care-giving, not 
formality. In short, given the Court’s express statement that it was not decid-
ing the law enforcement issue, assigning weight to the Court’s off-hand 
characterization of Brasier is suspect.  
III. Unanswered Questions  
What child abuse-related issues were left unanswered by Davis? Nearly 
all of them. Davis simply did not mention the key post-Crawford questions 
still plaguing lower courts. And again, to be fair, the Court had no reason to. 
So, it is the status quo on issues such as how to determine if a social worker, 
doctor, or teacher is acting as an agent of law enforcement; whether manda-
tory reporting laws influence the agency analysis; the interrelation between 
competency laws and the unavailability requirement or the forfeiture doc-
trine; and even a threshold question raised by some of the leading scholars 
in the area: should the statements of certain children, particularly very 
young children, fall outside the Confrontation Clause? True, the Court’s 
discussion of forfeiture is encouraging for child sexual abuse prosecutions 
because the nature of the crime and threats and intimidation by perpetrators 
coerces silence in young victims. But even then, the devil may be in the de-
tails. All that can be said with certainty about Davis is that it did not address 
or provide significant insight into the many Confrontation Clause issues in 
child abuse cases.  
Conclusion 
In the end, Davis likely will become a footnote in child abuse prosecu-
tions. It leaves many—if not most—of the issues surrounding child abuse 
cases on the table. In post-Crawford tradition, many undoubtedly will glean 
importance and draw inferences from stray sentences or omissions in the 
decision. True clarity, however, must await “another day.” 
